Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs and the Quest for Pan-American Unity: An Introductory Essay

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This volume is concerned with a United States war agency that was established in August 1940 as the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the American Republics (OCCCRBAR), but came to be better known as the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) or Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA). The OIAA, as we will refer to it for the sake of brevity, was the product of intense security concerns. By mid-1940, Nazi Germany had occupied vast areas of continental Europe and now seemed poised to crush the last remnants of Allied resistance. Though the future course of the war was impossible to foresee, U.S. policy makers feared that Nazi Germany's vastly enhanced power would have profound repercussions well beyond the confines of the Old Continent and not least in Latin America. To many observers in the United States, Latin America seemed ripe for a political, cultural and economic penetration, or even invasion, by Nazi Germany. Few observers in the United States trusted in the steadfastness of Latin American governments when it came to resisting the lures of Nazi Germany and its fascist allies. Democracy had not taken root in most of the countries south of the Rio Grande, and while knowledgeable analysts distinguished between Latin-style authoritarianism and the newer brands of European totalitarianism, they still viewed them as being rather compatible in practical policy terms. Due to war-related interruptions of international trade and capital flows, moreover, Latin America's vulnerable economies appeared to be on the brink of a severe downturn. Economic disruptions were expected to produce political destabilization that, in turn, was feared to provide a fertile ground for Axis interference. Indeed, by mid-1940, the U.S. media reported widely and rather sensationally on "Fifth Column" activities throughout Latin America and thus intensified anxieties in the wider public.[1]

As is well known, deepening security concerns did not produce a unanimous response. For some time to come, U.S. citizens would continue to be deeply divided on the question of whether or not their country should enter the war. But many on both sides of the divide became convinced that the Nazi menace required urgent action on the hemisphere front, that is, a concerted effort to bring the good neighbors to the south into a firm alliance against the Axis. "Affection for Latin Americans has broken out like a speckled rash on the skin of the North American body politic," historian Hubert Herring quipped when reviewing the flurry of activities his fellow citizens were now prepared to engage in. "Club-women read papers on the Humboldt Current, dress up as Aymarás, listen to guitarists strum tunes reputed to come from the Amazon. College presidents substitute courses on the Incas for those on the age of Pericles. Chambers of Commerce give dinners to visiting Argentine bankers, and keep up a set of twenty-one American flags among their props. Schoolgirls cut paper dolls which represent the dwellers by Atitlán."[2]

By August 1940, there existed a host of governmental and non-governmental initiatives "devoted to keeping the Americas one big family."[3] Nonetheless, President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided that the situation required more forceful measures. Against strenuous resistance from the Department of State, he established a new emergency agency that would coordinate existing initiatives and continue to mobilize the nation for the sake of hemisphere defense. The OIAA existed for less than six years. It was gradually dismantled as the war drew to its close and was abolished in April 1946. During its brief existence, however, it assumed a wide variety of functions and was restructured frequently in order to meet rapidly-changing policy demands. "One of the handicaps in putting down the activities of the Coordinator's Office on a neat government organization chart is that its basic instructions are simply to make itself useful," a journalist and advisor to the agency exclaimed when asked to produce a brief description of the new "machinery for hemisphere cooperation."[4] Notwithstanding this state of organizational flux, the OIAA's mandate may be resumed as follows: It was established to devise and coordinate policies that would diminish the influence of Nazi Germany and its allies in Latin America, deepen inter-American cooperation and secure Latin America's allegiance and assistance in the war effort and beyond.[5] For most of its existence, the OIAA was headed by the young multimillionaire and businessman Nelson A. Rockefeller, who served as the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs until late 1944.

The essays presented here highlight different facets of the OIAA's wide range of operations, but they focus specifically on those activities that aimed at influencing public opinion in support of overarching U.S. policy goals. They do not aim to provide an organizational history of the agency, nor do they endeavor to portray and analyze all of the major activities the Rockefeller office engaged in. They explore the nature, scope and, where possible, the tangible results of some of the more representative programs aiming at *hearts and minds.* As such, they complement a string of papers and publications that have recently engaged with the agency's informational and cultural programs. While this scholarship has contributed significantly to our understanding of the OIAA, it has not yet produced a comprehensive account of the agency,[6] and many of the more recent contributions are not easily accessible to English-speaking students and interested readers in general. This introduction, then, seeks to pull the strings together and provide an overview of an emerging body of knowledge. At the same time, it reviews a series of theoretical perspectives that have shaped scholarly debates on the issues at stake.

Scholarly interest in the OIAA and other government agencies seeking to reach and influence foreign audiences has waxed and waned with the times. In recent years, and following the September 11 attacks in 2001, interest in the possible role and effectiveness of such agencies increased markedly and spread well beyond academic circles. Many observers in the United States assumed that these attacks were also a result of a particular policy failure, that is, the failure to stem the tide of ardent anti-Americanism by effectively communicating U.S. foreign policies, their guiding principles and objectives to the world at large and to Arab societies in particular. The events of September 11 and the political fallout thereafter thus sparked lively debates over the effectiveness and limitations of such programs, both past and present.

While these debates are important for the present case study in that they have brought to the fore a series of conceptual terms such as *public diplomacy* and *soft power* that need to be addressed in a volume such as this one, they have done little to advance knowledge about the OIAA in particular.[7] Research on the OIAA seems to have benefited more from concurrent, albeit less dramatic trends in scholarship. It was not so much September 11 but the coming of the cultural turn to the study of international relations that paved the way for a renewed interest in the agency's activities.[8] And it was the subsequent postcolonial turn and, more precisely, a growing uneasiness with research agendas that ascribe historical agency to the United States, while

paying little or no attention to Latin America's part in the equation of inter-American relations,[9] that inspired researchers to take a deeper look into the OIAA's activities and how these worked out on the ground. Although many of these more recent contributions do not focus squarely on the OIAA, they add interpretative dimensions to the story.[10]

Not surprisingly, the aforementioned debates and trends in current scholarship have not produced a commonly-accepted analytical framework. And the authors presented here, although not primarily concerned with theoretical issues, would not subscribe to a single school of thought. Rather than advancing a particular strain of theory, then, this essay reflects on the potential insights and limitations of some of the more prominent analytical frameworks when applied to the OIAA.

Propaganda, public diplomacy and public relations

The OIAA's policies seeking to influence public opinion varied greatly in nature, which makes it impossible to categorize them *tout court.* The agency itself referred to some of its operations, namely the production and distribution of contents to be delivered through mass communication channels, as *propaganda*. The OIAA's turn toward an overtly propagandistic approach did not come without considerable debates, as Uwe Lübken explains in chapter 1. In public pronouncements the agency always insisted that it employed nothing but the truth and, by and large, it did not resort to manifest falsehoods to present its case. Compared to the propaganda strategies that had flourished during World War I and that were now being revived by Nazi Germany, the contents produced and distributed by the OIAA's Press, Radio and Motion Picture Divisions appear rather restrained in nature. At the same time, however, it is obvious that the OIAA was not a mere information agency. Internal memoranda on the subject as well as daily or weekly directives guiding the production and dissemination of news and other materials[11] readily conceded that the OIAA was consciously selecting and framing contents in order to elicit a desired response. Although such content directives never clearly defined *propaganda*, they coincide, to some extent, with a more recent and popular definition proposed by Garth Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, according to which propaganda is "the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist."[12]

Although this and other standard definitions of *propaganda* assume some kind of communicative act, they focus primarily on the purpose of an activity that is undertaken deliberately and systematically by a clearly-defined actor. As such, they serve rather well when employed to analyze the contents and underlying intentions of some of the OIAA's major and massive programs. But they are not too helpful when employed to explore how these programs evolved on the ground. And they do not fully capture the nature of a range of policies (to be discussed below) that do not quite fit the unified-actor model that underlies most standard definitions of propaganda.

If the OIAA were operating today, it would probably prefer to employ the terms *public diplomacy* and *public relations* to explain its mission. *Public diplomacy* was coined in the 1960s, not least to distinguish the U.S. government's informational and cultural activities abroad from *propaganda,* which by then had acquired strongly negative connotations associated with systematic lying and deceit. Not surprisingly, *public diplomacy* soon became part of the official terminology describing the activities of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and similar enterprises. In contrast to traditional diplomacy, which seeks to further the ends of politics by interacting with foreign governments and dignitaries, public diplomacy engages with foreign societies at large. Its domestic counterpart is *public relations,* which, if employed by a government, seeks to further the ends of politics by engaging with the public at home.

It is worth noting at this point that the OIAA operated in both realms, in contrast, say, to the USIA (1953-99) which spoke to the world at large but was endowed with a mandate that severely limited its interactions with domestic audiences.[13] This duality of purpose also distinguishes the OIAA from contemporary agencies competing for hearts and minds in Latin America. For instance, the Nazi propaganda machine certainly mobilized domestic institutions such as the Ibero-American Institute in Berlin in order to increase Germany's presence and influence in Latin America, but it did not set out to impress the German public at large with the need for closing ranks with Latin America, whereas it did make a concerted effort to persuade Latin Americans to view Nazi Germany as a natural ally in their struggles for material wellbeing, freedom and national self-determination. The OIAA's approach, of course, was inscribed in a different meta-discourse that reflected distinct geopolitical realities. It promoted (a U.S.-inflected) Pan-Americanism, that is, the idea that the American republics were welded together by the combined forces of geography and history, shared common interests and were thus des-

tined to work together under the benign guidance of the United States, although it usually couched its discursive approach in terms of *inter-* rather than *Pan-*Americanism so as to suggest cooperation among equals. As such, the OIAA addressed audiences on both sides of the Rio Grande when seeking to instill what was called "sympathetic understanding" between not just allies, but sister republics, and a sense of common purpose and destiny that set them apart not only from Nazi Germany and the Axis, but also from Europe and the rest of the world.[14]

In contrast to *propaganda,* the terms *public diplomacy* and *public relations* have a somewhat softer ring to them and they suggest that some kind of interaction or negotiation is going on with the targeted audiences. Indeed, advocates of public diplomacy tend to stress the possibility and even the necessity of including audiences as active participants in the policy process. "Communicating with the world,"[15] they proclaim, is a two-way affair and thus requires the agencies involved not to talk *at*, but to talk and listen *to* other peoples. Although many critical observers of U.S. interactions with the rest of the world have been rather dismissive on this score, the conceptualization of the OIAA's activities as *public diplomacy* and *public relations* may open analytical perspectives that a focus on propaganda misses out on. *Public diplomacy*, moreover, is usually understood to be a broader category in that it comprises a range of policies that do not sit well with *propaganda* as defined above. That is, it also includes those programs that, in one way or other, were assisted by the OIAA, but were initiated and carried out by private citizens and institutions that operated with relative autonomy. Most of the latter programs were related to cultural diplomacy, an important branch of public diplomacy.[16]

The OIAA was established to operate primarily as a coordination agency that would avoid bureaucratic buildup by relying on the expertise and resources of other players in the field, both public and private. It was to assist existing government agencies to better coordinate their policies toward Latin America and thus increase efficiency in the foreign policy process. And it was to mobilize vast sectors of the U.S. business community and civil society at large for the sake of hemisphere defense. Notwithstanding its original mandate, the OIAA soon developed a formidable propaganda machine of its own that flooded the Americas with a stream of rather tightly-controlled messages, delivered by radio, 16mm films, magazines, pamphlets, posters and other means (for some of the major operational branches, see Figures 1-4).

Yet it also continued to encourage and support initiatives that it deemed valuable but that it had limited control over, particularly in the field of cultural

Figure 1 and 2
Major centralized propaganda operations: the OIAA's Press Division (1945)



Source: Donald W. Rowland, *U.S. Office for Inter-American Affairs, History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs*, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947, 47, 44.

diplomacy. In a way, the latter mode of operation bowed to a more traditional view on how the American people should interact with other peoples. This view held that culture was a sphere that should be left to civil society and free of government interference.[17] Now, of course, the OIAA was adding big money to the traditional way of doing things, which allowed those favored by government largess to increase their scope of operations without any or much government interference. Thus, OIAA grants enabled the Institute of International Education and even the Rockefeller Foundation and other well-endowed private organizations to considerably expand their scholarship programs for Latin America. Financial support helped universities to establish or expand Latin American institutes and studies programs. Museums throughout the United States were assisted to organize exhibitions with a Pan-American spin, but were otherwise left with a free hand to select and present the contents in whatever ways they saw fit. Indeed, a closer look into the myriad of lesser initiatives suggests that the OIAA engaged rather large subsets of society in cultural exchange and, more generally, public diplo-

Figure 3 and 4
Major centralized propaganda operations:
the OIAA's Motion Picture and Radio Divisions (1944)



Source: Donald W. Rowland, *U.S. Office for Inter-American Affairs, History of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs*, Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947, 73, 62

macy. By providing informational materials, contacts, guest speakers, small- and large-scale grants, it encouraged hundreds of organizations and institutions, from the Boy Scouts to the American Legion, from women's clubs to Catholic welfare organizations, from trade unions to business associations, from small-town community centers to metropolitan art museums and from primary schools to universities, to organize events on inter-American affairs and to establish or intensify ties with fellow institutions in Latin America. Hence, while orchestrated by the OIAA, the gospel of Pan-American unity came to be sung in many voices and not necessarily in unison.[18]

Our point here is not to suggest that public diplomacy, when carried out with little or no state control, is *per se* clearly distinguishable from propaganda. Indeed, *any one* of the initiatives undertaken by independent agents may fit the propaganda model mentioned above perfectly well and some of the contents they carried may have been as propagandistic as those produced and disseminated by the OIAA.[19] When viewed together and analyzed from a public policy perspective, however, it becomes apparent that such a del-

egation of initiative produces highly-divergent outcomes. There is a world of difference between the ways Walt Disney and Orson Welles filled their roles as "goodwill ambassadors," as Catherine Benamou shows in chapter 3. Both were engaged to produce films that were meant to further hemisphere unity, but they interpreted the task at hand in their own, distinct ways. What is more, such delegation of initiative produced a multiplicity of discourses that, although supported by the OIAA, were not reducible to the intents of the latter and some may even have undermined aspects of what the OIAA was trying to communicate. Chapter 2 by Pennee Bender nicely illustrates this point. In educational (16mm) films produced and distributed by the OIAA and tightly-controlled by both the OIAA and the State Department, the discursive strategy chosen to endear Latin America and its citizens to U.S. audiences rested, to some extent, on representations of *sameness*. Distributed widely through the educational system and other circuits, these documentaries were bent on destabilizing ideas of Latin America as being "backward" and essentially "different" by highlighting similarities between the North and South American ways of life and by focusing on themes that were familiar and thus comforting for audiences in the United States. Disney and other Hollywood producers also sought to endear the good neighbors to U.S. audiences, but – as various film historians have shown – they often harked back to representational strategies that rested on the exotic, that is, on a long-standing and familiar discourse of *othering*.[20] By catering to deeply-ingrained notions of Latin America as the exotic (and erotic) *other*, Disney and other producers of mass entertainment were seeking to attract audiences and increase their returns at the box office. Their strategies were dictated not least by what they perceived to be the demands of the market. By greatly increasing the presence of Latin talents and Pan-American topics in movies and newsreels, they cooperated with the OIAA, but they did so on their own terms and they produced contents that diverged from the agency's own discursive agenda. Recent research on U.S. radio networks and their good-neighbor programs points in a similar direction.[21]

A decentralized approach to public relations or public diplomacy tends to increase what may be called *discursive dispersal*. It may thus produce inconsistent and even contradictory contents. Discursive dispersal, however, does not necessarily undermine the intents of public policies sponsoring such decentralized initiatives. Given that public opinion is not a homogenous block, it may even be advantageous, particularly in cultural exchange and other programs that seek to establish deep attachments to specific subsets of society. It

takes very different approaches to endear the United States, say, to conservative Catholics, to liberal modernizers or to left-leaning artists. By delegating initiative and agency, decentralized cultural programs are able to cater to very diverse audiences.

Power – soft, hard or other

At this point, a word is due to *soft power,* a term that, together with *public diplomacy,* has recently become a buzzword not just among international relations scholars, but among the public at large. As defined by Joseph Nye, "soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments."[22] If hard power relies on sticks and carrots, that is, on the ability to induce a desired behavior through threats or payoffs, soft power is generated by societies that develop qualities which favorably impress and attract other peoples. According to Nye, this power to attract has been an important asset for the United States and particularly when struggling for supremacy in the Cold War. More important for our purposes here, Nye also suggests that soft power can be harnessed as a foreign-policy tool, if such attractive qualities are communicated effectively by public diplomacy. The latter involves straightforward communications, that is, government-sponsored broadcasts and other programs that communicate with foreign audiences in order to have them understand and appreciate the United States in general and U.S. policies on sensitive issues in particular. It also involves indirect strategies, for instance, government support for scholarship and exchange programs that reach out to key groups in foreign countries. By establishing close rapport with, say, publishers or journalists, public diplomacy amplifies its impact on foreign societies. And by attracting the best and the brightest of foreign students, U.S. institutions educate future leaders and socialize them into a way of thinking and habits of framing policy problems that are amicable to U.S. interests. Nye admits that public diplomacy is easily undermined by actual foreign policies if the latter go against the grain of what the former seeks to communicate. But if combined "smartly" with foreign policies, he argues, public diplomacy enhances soft power resources and thus reduces the need to employ coercion or payments in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.[23]

Theory-inclined critics have picked up on inconsistencies and ambiguities in Nye's conceptual framework and many historians have remained rather skeptical on empirical grounds. "Some analysts stress the importance

of American 'soft power'," historian Alan Knight observed, "but the problem with soft power is that it is difficult both to acquire and to deploy in a conscious, purposive way."[24] Indeed, this difficulty to "acquire and to deploy soft power in a conscious, purposive way" is borne out by various contributions presented in this volume.

Moreover, and when applied to the case study at hand, this conceptual framework needs to be qualified. Many of the OIAA's policies seeking to influence public opinion in Latin America do fall into a category that is now commonly described as *public diplomacy*, one that Nye and others view as a prominent vehicle for the purposive deployment of soft power. Not surprisingly, therefore, recent publications on the history of U.S. public diplomacy list the OIAA as one of a string of agencies that have served these ends in the past.[25] Yet the OIAA also employed strategies that had a harder edge to them and that would fall into a gray zone, if not outright into the hard power category.

In Latin America, the OIAA assisted in what was called "economic warfare." Together with other wartime agencies and U.S. embassies, it monitored Latin American societies at large and the public sphere in particular for Axis influence. And it wielded substantial coercive power when it came to weeding out pro-Axis or otherwise hostile contents in the media. This coercive capability resulted partly from the fact that Latin American newspapers, radio stations, the movie industry and cinemas depended on a steady supply of printing paper, radio bulbs, raw films, spare parts and other critical inputs that, by and large and due to abnormal trading conditions during the war, could only be imported from North America. It was further enhanced by dependence on U.S. advertisements. If U.S. companies had sponsored a large share of total advertising in Latin America's newspapers and radio stations during the preceding years, their relative importance increased during the war. As the European competition all but vanished on the advertisement horizon, new tax regulations in the United States encouraged companies to maintain or to increase their outlays even when the products they advertised were unavailable for the time being.[26] Given this state of affairs, combined pressure by U.S. companies, under the guidance of the OIAA and U.S. embassies, could bring recalcitrant media outlets to heel. This is not to suggest that U.S. agencies were hovering like a Behemoth over the Latin American public sphere, ready to strike against each and every statement favoring the enemy, real or perceived. But where they did intervene they seem to have been rather successful. Indeed, merely threatening to withhold critical supplies and

advertisement contracts could work wonders. In Colombia, for instance, it was not the timid liberal government that brought the major oppositional and pro-fascist newspaper, *El Siglo,* to mend its ways but a hint from the U.S. ambassador.[27] And in Argentina, where neutralist governments were trying hard to stay on good terms with Nazi Germany and were therefore loath to cooperate in the purging of the media, the OIAA established a thorough monitoring system that checked up not only on newspapers and radio stations throughout the country's vast territory, but also on the cinemas. By threatening to withhold popular Hollywood movies from a given cinema, the agency was in most cases able to put a stop to the exhibition of pro-Axis films and newsreels.[28] This coercive capacity is probably most visible in those contexts where local authorities were either too weak or unwilling to cooperate in the purging of the media. But, as chapter 5 by José Luis Ortiz Garza shows, it was also operating in Mexico where the government was neither weak nor uncooperative. Thus, while few observers today would bemoan the disappearance of pro-Axis contents from the Latin American media, it needs to be stressed that the OIAA was part of a power configuration that displayed attributes of a censor.

A related aspect points to the difficulty of neatly distinguishing between soft and hard power strategies. Soft as they may seem, some of the OIAA's major operations seeking to reach and influence hearts and minds fall into a gray zone. Take, for instance, the placement of feature articles with Latin American newspapers and magazines. Distributed free of charge, these ready-for-print items typically provided glossy portrayals of the American way of life, the state of the war economy and public morale in the United States. The OIAA was proud to record considerable placement rates, particularly with provincial and smaller media outlets that were too poor to subscribe to commercial feature and news services, as was the case in much of Central America.[29] (Chapter 8 by Thomas Leonard displays the placement rates for Central America.) But how do we account for the OIAA's ability to place such items? Those newspaper and magazine editors who chose to cooperate may have done so because they were attracted to the contents and the Allied cause in general. As the OIAA was well aware, however, they also may have done so in order to curry favor with an agency that seemed all-important when it came to procuring advertisement contracts and critical materials in short supply.

Indeed, payoffs were an important ingredient in the OIAA's bid for Latin America's hearts and minds. This is most obvious in those programs that,

in one way or another, depended on local mediation involving private entrepreneurs. The OIAA's recruitment of the Mexican film industry, to name a well-known example, involved large-scale transfers of technology and scarce products. Mexican movies reached large audiences throughout Latin America and were therefore thought to be a promising vehicle for the production and deployment of popular entertainment contents with a Pan-American spin.[30] Radio was another medium that promised to reach mass audiences. Throughout Latin America, the OIAA employed local stations and producers to prepare and broadcast programs on its behalf. By and large, as chapter 6 in this volume shows, such transnational outsourcing of propaganda activities involved contractual arrangements and payments for station time and other services rendered, that is, payoffs. This is not to imply that such contractual arrangements were necessarily of a purely commercial character. Argentina's leading radio entrepreneurs, for instance, also cooperated out of sympathy for the Allied cause and so did renowned journalists and writers such as Colombia's Enrique Santos ("Calibán") and Cuba's Alejo Carpentier, who authored OIAA-sponsored political commentary and dramatized radio programs, respectively.[31] Yet it is also clear that the volume and scale of the OIAA's operations rested not least on its capacity to contract key players in the public sphere. While not invalidating Nye's analytical distinctions between hard and soft power *per se*, a closer look into the OIAA's strategies to influence public opinion abroad suggests that these rested on more than soft resources and involved both coercion and payments. It also suggests that the term *public diplomacy*, as understood by Nye and many others, does not capture the full range of policies the OIAA was employing in Latin America.

Likewise, the term *public relations* does not do full justice to the strategies the OIAA unfolded on the home front. The agency watched over the ways the other American republics were being represented in the U.S. media and it sought to brighten the image Latin Americans commanded in the public sphere. Toward this end, it promoted a wide range of activities, including art exhibitions and concerts that were meant to introduce U.S. audiences to more serious or respectable angles of Latin America's cultural heritage. It sponsored the translation into English of outstanding novelists and it published travel guides that were meant to sensitize prospective tourists not only to Latin America's natural and cultural treasures, but also to its mores and etiquette. And, as public relations agencies typically do, it generated informational materials that were offered to newspapers, magazines, radio stations and other interested parties throughout the United States. Such materials typ-

ically highlighted the contributions of the sister republics to the war effort, their institutional advancements and progressiveness in general, while downplaying or omitting information that might undermine the desired intent.[32] At the same time, however, the OIAA also wielded a measure of censorship authority, albeit exercised on a veiled, consensual basis. To be sure, it did not control the multitude of "representational machines"[33] operating in the United States. By and large, it could do little more than write letters of protest against demeaning or otherwise damaging contents to editors, station managers and other responsible parties.[34] However, it did cooperate with major players in the representational arena, most notably with Hollywood's studios, in order to establish a mild form of censorship. As is well-known, the studios agreed to submit to the guidance and oversight of locally-established representatives from the OIAA, who screened film scripts containing references to Latin America for contents that could damage inter-American relations. Also, the OIAA could and did stop the export of movies that conveyed overt criticism of the United States and the American way of life and that it considered unsuitable for Latin American audiences.[35]

Critical materialist approaches

For scholars closer to historical materialist perspectives the interpretative framework discussed thus far does not just miss some operational dimensions, it ignores the very essence of the OIAA. These scholars would not necessarily dismiss the idea that power may also rest on consent and that public diplomacy and public relations may serve to build such consent. Indeed, neo-Gramscian approaches to international relations to some extent overlap with Nye's soft power paradigm. Both assume that power in the international system is not reducible to coercion and coercive capabilities but also rests on the capacity to coopt by non-coercive means. But whereas in Nye's liberal vision the United States' power to coopt has worked toward a common good and therefore benefited also those coopted by it, critical scholars informed by historical materialism in general and Gramscian notions of hegemony in particular would argue that such a power to make others follow *willingly* is working, first and foremost, toward the interest of the hegemon.[36]

Those critical materialists closer to the Marxian roots, moreover, and in contrast to mainstream analysts in International Relations, refuse to think of the state as a unitary actor working toward objectives defined by national

interest. They rather view the state as a reflection of a coalition of interests which dominate the prevalent socio-economic matrix. As such, they stress the embeddedness of state agencies seeking to construct hegemony in a structure of interests that drive and circumscribe the policies undertaken.[37] Thus, rather than stating, as we did before, that the OIAA engaged broad segments of civil society in the task of cultural relations in particular and public diplomacy in general, these scholars would contend that the agency was the expression of a dominant coalition, albeit one that commanded broad-based support.

Undoubtedly, the OIAA's drive to secure hemisphere unity was not open to all. Headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller, the well-connected scion of one of the richest families in the nation with considerable investments in Latin America, the OIAA established a close rapport with the corporate business community and cultural elites. It embraced a range of individuals that represented non-elite sectors, including left-leaning artists, writers and film directors as well as mainstream trade unionists. But it was not open to all interested parties, and admittance was restricted not only in terms of class. Not surprisingly, it shied away from embracing African-American activists who sought to further their own, politically assertive brand of Pan-Americanism. Rockefeller and the more enlightened of the agency's operators were well aware that racism and segregation in the United States were casting a shadow on their efforts to favorably impress Latin American audiences with the American way of life. They openly praised Latin America for being more progressive in racial matters.[38] But their support for activists such as W.E.B. DuBois and Rayford Logan, who sought to imbue the agency with more assertive policies on racial matters, was lukewarm at best. Logan was invited as an advisor to the OIAA, but was kept at arm's length when it came to devising policies.[39] No doubt, fully embracing Pan-African activism would have ruffled too many feathers, in both the United States and in Latin America.[40] More telling, perhaps, is the OIAA's positioning on domestic Hispanic issues. It was clearly alarmed by racist incidents such as those recorded during the so-called Zoot-Suit riots in California in 1943. Such incidents impinged on the credibility of the discourse of fraternity it was trying so hard to disseminate, both at home and abroad. Yet, if push came to shove, the OIAA refrained from taking an aggressive, public stance in favor of protecting Hispanic communities from racist assaults.[41] The OIAA's advocacy, in other words, was limited by implicit rules governing the domestic matrix of social relations.

Those critical materialists who refuse to follow a state-centered approach would further insist that the forces coalescing in the OIAA's orbit were not

simply the product of general anxieties over national security as a public good, but reflected vested economic interests. It is hard to deny that the actors involved also had their own and very specific interests at heart. Indeed, Nelson Rockefeller's interest and engagement in inter-American affairs predated the Nazi menace. His initial involvement was sparked by a different menace, that is, the rising threat of Latin American nationalism that jeopardized U.S. investments in the region, most notably in the oil sector.[42] Hollywood's studios had very good reasons of their own to closely cooperate with the OIAA and even to submit to a mild form of censorship. Since most of their lucrative European markets were now closed to them, California's dream factories were more eager than ever to increase their sales in Latin America. They were therefore keen to avoid contents that could affront Latin sensibilities. Other entrepreneurs now saw a chance to increase their market shares by exporting goods and services that Latin America had hitherto imported from Europe. For this reason, the U.S. fashion and cosmetics industries, to use a lesser-known example, developed a keener interest in Latin American women.[43] They were called upon by the OIAA to participate in a concerted effort to wean the good neighbors from their cultural infatuation with Europe and turn them instead to the United States for aesthetic (and other) guidance,[44] but they had strong incentives of their own and would have pushed ahead even in the absence of the OIAA. And if the publishers of the *Reader's Digest* were now turning out Spanish and Portuguese-language editions for Latin American readers, they were not simply following their government's call to action. They were also engaging in business. The forces driving cultural expansion were also and not least responding to market opportunities. And yet, while supporting economic expansion into Latin America, the OIAA was clearly more than the handmaiden of big business. It could and did override vested interests if these stood in the way of hemisphere defense.[45] And it could and did displace the private sector if the latter proved inadequate for the task at hand, as happened in international shortwave broadcasting.[46]

Whereas it would be wrong to underestimate market forces, we suggest that it would be equally wrong to single out business interests as the only ones to pursue private objectives. Non-profit organizations and civil associations are not above having objectives of their own and those participating in the OIAA's hemisphere defense policies were no exception. We do not wish to deny that patriotism and anxieties over the course of world affairs were driving the broad range of civic activism that coalesced in the OIAA's orbit. But we do suggest that these actors, at the same time, were advancing their

own objectives when pursuing their particular brand of Pan-Americanism. Catholic associations, to name but one (albeit under-researched) example, responded eagerly to the OIAA's call for hemisphere defense and were encouraged by grants and other means to organize inter-American events and deepen contacts. By strengthening their relations with fellow institutions in Latin America, they worked toward hemisphere unity, but they also engaged in the defense of the Catholic Church. Indeed, they attempted (unsuccessfully) to capitalize on their newly-increased importance in foreign affairs by demanding that the U.S. government should stop its citizens from engaging in Protestant missions in Latin America. Protestant missionaries, Catholic activists argued, were a liability to the good-neighbor policy since they offended the overwhelmingly Catholic societies south of the Rio Grande and therefore should be curtailed.[47]

Scholars informed by historical materialism and dependency theory – a current closer to Latin American traditions of thought – tend to focus on the political economy of capitalism, that is, on the sheer capacity to dominate the structures of production and reproduction. This perspective guided much of the critical scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s and was particularly pronounced in media studies. Communications scholars increasingly turned away from previously-dominant research models which suggested that the media have rather limited effects on audiences. Instead, they turned to new models (such as "agenda setting") that allocate far more sociopolitical power to the mass media. This paradigmatic shift made it imperative to study how media contents are produced and it inspired broad currents of scholars to critically engage with corporate media interests and their ability to shape contents and set agendas in the entertainment and, especially, the news markets. It also inspired critical engagement with the expansion of corporate, and particularly North American, media interests into less developed regions of the world.[48] What came to be known as the "media imperialism paradigm" tends to be associated with the work of scholars such as Herbert I. Schiller or Armand Mattelart, who integrated their work into a broader anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist critique.[49] Closer to the case study at hand, Fred Fejes employed the media imperialism paradigm to analyze the expansion of the U.S. broadcasting industry into Latin America. More specifically, he suggested that a close cooperation between private interests and the U.S. government, that is, the OIAA, paved the way for a successful penetration and domination of Latin America's mass communication systems by U.S. corporate interests.[50] (The issue is revisited in chapter 6.) This was an approach that was

deeply concerned with the possible consequences of media imperialism for less-developed or dependent societies in the Third World and elsewhere, but that was not particularly given to empirically evaluating the impact said imperialism has on the ways the audiences on the receiving end react, think and act. The media were assumed to be "manipulative agents" and "capable of having direct, unmediated effects on the audience's behavior and world views," as Fejes himself pointed out in a critical assessment of the media imperialism paradigm.[51] Much of the recent scholarship, in turn, questions such assumptions. While not denying fundamental asymmetries in the distribution of power in the media markets and other spheres, it sheds doubt on the capacity of corporate or state interests to have such unmediated access and to effectively control or manipulate the way people think and act.

Contemporary doubts and recent research

Doubts about the effectiveness of the OIAA in practical policy terms are, of course, not new, although the agency itself made considerable efforts to demonstrate its usefulness. It compiled data on the volume of contents it produced and disseminated and it reported on the increase of inter-American exchanges it helped to bring about. It was the first to carry out systematic opinion polls and media surveys in Latin America,[52] and in the United States it measured the pulse of the public by evaluating how U.S. citizens thought and felt about the good neighbors to the south. In the United States, OIAA-sponsored research suggested that public opinion toward Latin Americans improved somewhat during the war.[53] In Latin America, its surveys produced a wealth of information on media consumption and related subjects, but little about the possible impact it had on public opinion. In the end, it was unable to ascertain what exactly its programs were achieving.

In the United States, public debate on the OIAA was rather muted.[54] Compared to the Office of War Information (OWI) and other war agencies established to manage public opinion, the OIAA sparked comparatively few disputes in the public arena. And it met with relatively little resistance in Congress when defending its rapidly-expanding budget.[55] Nevertheless, there were those who voiced their doubts as to the agency's effectiveness. Some ambassadors and career diplomats stationed in Latin America expressed open dismay at what they perceived as boondoggling amateurs invading their turf and many observers in the State Department were less than taken by

the brashness of the whole enterprise. "It started out in true United States fashion to do a bigger and better job, fast, of propaganda on the launch-a-new-brand-of-spaghetti model, plus whirlwind visits of professors, students, artists, newspapermen, movie actors, and government officials," wrote Laurence Duggan from the State Department's Latin American Division. "The sound and fury were imposing, but the benefit to mutual understanding was not large."[56] Similar observations were ventured in Latin America, particularly by those critics who were otherwise sympathetic to the Allied cause. "We wish to cooperate enthusiastically in a great effort toward continental unity," expressed, for instance, Argentina's popular radio magazine *Sintonía* in an open letter to goodwill ambassador Douglas Fairbanks in August 1941. "But we refuse to accept all the forced machinery of a rediscovery of Latin America and of putting the formidable technical and financial power of the American movies, the radio and the press at the service of a sudden continental conquest."[57] It thus seems that the OIAA's very ability to expose audiences to a massive discharge of propaganda and whirlwind goodwill ambassadors produced less-than-favorable reactions, at least in some quarters.

The OIAA's propaganda enterprise, moreover, was pervaded by a tension between high-minded rhetoric and the demands of realpolitik. On the one hand, high-minded rhetoric depicted inter-American cooperation in the war effort as the product of a natural alliance between sister republics in an ongoing struggle for freedom and democracy that had united them since the wars of independence from European colonialism. On the other hand, and at least during the early stages of the war,[58] realpolitik dictated that the OIAA would celebrate Latin American cooperation, even if it came from petty dictators of the likes of Rafael Trujillo who governed the Dominican Republic as his personal fiefdom. Trujillo and others jumped at the occasion to have themselves presented in a favorable light to the public at home and in the United States. What was particularly galling to some critics was the ease with which Nelson Rockefeller acquiesced to the demands of realpolitik. U.S. ambassador Ellis O. Briggs, one of the more outspoken critics, openly challenged Rockefeller on this account and was quickly removed from his post in the Dominican Republic, to the great delight of Trujillo.[59] This episode, it needs to be stressed, was rather exceptional. After a somewhat bumpy start, Rockefeller and his office managed to peacefully coexist with both the Department of State and its representatives in Latin America, although the particular terms of this coexistence varied greatly across the region as some of the following chapters on Brazil, Mexico and Central America suggest. Yet, this inherent tension set

limits to the OIAA's capacity to enlist Latin America's pro-democracy forces in its crusade for continental unity, particularly in those countries where the latter faced regimes that were highly oppressive but cooperative in the Allied war effort.[60]

Furthermore, and notwithstanding the need to differentiate and analyze specific contexts, it seems that a certain feature in the OIAA's propagandistic approach provoked less-than-favorable or even strongly negative reactions throughout Latin America, as contemporary critics and recent case studies suggest. The OIAA went far beyond what U.S. public diplomacy is generally expected to do, that is, "to tell America's story."[61] It also told the story of the Americas. That is, it sought to construct a convincing narrative that would instill a sense of belonging and duty to an "imagined community" on a Pan-American scale.[62] In search of suitable content materials, the OIAA's "representational machine" tapped into Latin America's historical and cultural heritage. It drew on national emblems and emblematic events which it re-construed, in a more or less willful fashion, in order to both legitimize and naturalize cooperation with, and allegiance to, the United States. This was a discursive device that easily misfired. In order to be convincing and not appear a cheap propagandistic ploy, it required not just factual knowledge, but profound cultural sensibilities and familiarity with local representational traditions. For instance, to enlist Latin America's heroes of independence in dramatized radio programs and have them dwell on the meaning of past and, by implication, present struggles was liable to produce unconvincing results. Apart from avoiding egregious factual errors that did not fail to incense listeners,[63] the OIAA's scriptwriters faced the daunting task of ascribing to these characters a voice, accent and other mannerisms that would "feel right" to culturally distant audiences.[64] This was an exceedingly difficult task. Although otherwise highly successful at Latin American box offices, Hollywood did not fare better on this account. Hollywood productions that tried to infuse entertainment with a Pan-American spin easily misfired. For example, "Juarez," a Warner Bros. production, brought Benito Juárez onto the screen as the Mexican Lincoln, "right down to his shuffling walk, ill-fitting frock coat, unassuming bow tie, and stovepipe hat." This was a Juárez who dwelled heavily on his admiration for Lincoln, a portrait of whom he carried around with him through much of the film. Starring Paul Muni, Bette Davis and Brian Aherne, "Juarez" was a rather elaborate attempt at translating Pan-Americanism into a popular language by providing a "visual image of the ties between the two republics." However, whereas this approach may have fit

into North American representational traditions, it clearly failed to connect to Mexican audiences.[65]

The construction of a Pan-American narrative involved representational pitfalls that were difficult to overcome. Orson Welles, for one, chose to address such pitfalls by deeply immersing himself and his film crew in Brazilian music, history and life in general. He meant to distill a Pan-Americanism that would speak not only to the need for a common front against immediate dangers emanating from overseas, but to a deeper quest for more inclusive societies that responded to grass-root needs. Yet, for reasons explained in chapter 3, this was an approach that ultimately failed to come to fruition. What did come to fruition was a series of Hollywood musicals that delved into Latin America's cultural reservoir by jumbling rather distinct popular cultures and musical traditions into a Pan-American brew that could not but produce ill-will.[66] Argentina's well-meaning but outspoken *Sintonía* felt obliged to impart some harsh advice: "Go back to your great and beautiful country with the feeling of the most sincere *gaucha* friendship," the magazine's open letter to goodwill ambassador Douglas Fairbanks exclaimed. "But tell your President, your industrialists, your business men, your newspaper men, that Argentina wants to be a self-made nation. And tell them that we shall welcome with open arms every expression of North American culture, so long as these are expressions of North America herself."[67]

This was a piece of advice that the OIAA was not going to take. Instead, and in order to avoid such representational pitfalls in the construction of an encompassing all-American narrative, the agency increasingly resorted to transnational outsourcing. As mentioned before, and in order to produce popular imaginings with a Pan-American spin, it turned to the Mexican film industry. And throughout Latin America, the OIAA contracted local talent to produce radio programs and press articles to further its cause. Judging from the available, albeit scattered, evidence, it seems that the contents thus produced were better suited to national sensibilities, linguistic and other idiosyncrasies and therefore faced fewer cultural barriers on the reception side. Some of these contents even left a lasting impression. For instance, "Soy puro mexicano," a song composed for a wartime drama, which depicts Pan-American cooperation in the fight against Axis espionage in the American hemisphere, morphed into Mexico's "second national anthem," as Francisco Peredo Castro points out.[68] Yet, even when it is possible to measure the popularity of such transnationally-produced contents in terms of box office returns, audi-

ence ratings and similar indicators, measuring their effects in practical policy terms is a very different matter. What did they achieve?

Some contemporary observers were utterly dismissive on deeper and largely theoretical grounds. Those steeped in orthodox Realism questioned the whole enterprise. For instance, political scientist Nicholas John Spykman denied that programs intended to instill sympathetic understanding and related sentiments would make any meaningful contribution to U.S. foreign policies. "Alliances are made in terms of geography and balance of power, not in terms of sentiment," he asserted, "and if there is a certain friendly feeling toward an ally, it is usually the effect and not the cause of political cooperation." Spykman therefore found "this thesis of a Pan American identity [and] cultural affinity" as championed by the OIAA to be a "noble idea, but completely invalid."[69]

Few scholars of inter-American relations, however, have subscribed to classical Realism or, for that matter, to its more sophisticated neorealist variants. And along with today's constructivists in international relations theory, many would rather subscribe to the idea that sympathy, a sense of belonging or shared identities (and the absence thereof) may indeed constitute, in and by themselves, important causal variables to explain the behavior of governments and other actors in the international arena. Recent theoretical and empirical research by David Rousseau and other scholars of international relations suggests that such sentiments are not simply a reflection of a given geopolitical order but are socially constructed and, more important to our purposes here, malleable and open to intervention or manipulation.[70] Yet, what much of the more recent scholarship on the OIAA and similar ventures is questioning is the capacity of the United States (or other powers) to unilaterally impose sentiments and ways of thinking.

A common thread that unites these recent and otherwise heterogenous contributions is the attention they pay to the ways in which the OIAA's programs (and similar ventures) were implemented on the ground. Rather than focusing narrowly on the "desired intents" and on the policies employed to achieve them, they highlight the agency of a multiplicity of forces that, in one way or another, shaped concrete outcomes. These outcomes, they suggest, are not reducible to the intents of the OIAA. And although the latter may have exercised considerable power, it was unable to fully control the processes it set, or helped to set, in motion.

The work of Seth Fein is a case in point. When analyzing the contents of Mexican films produced under the OIAA's guidance, he found that the

films promoted a Pan-Americanism inflected by Mexican claims to preeminence in the representational enterprise.[71] Indeed, this feature helps to explain why such transnationally-produced contents were relatively successful. The long-lasting success of the aforementioned "Soy puro mexicano" may serve as an indicator for the forces at work. Though clearly keeping in line with the OIAA's discursive agenda by incorporating a few verses that hail Pan-American unity, democracy and liberty ("¡Viva América!," "¡Viva la democracia! ¡y también la libertad!"), the song is first and foremost a homage to Mexico.[72]

In this volume, Catha Paquette (chapter 4) revisits the OIAA's fine arts programs as spearheaded by the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) and their impact on U.S.-Mexican relations. She contends that the "OIAA was both persistent and creative in its efforts to manipulate the symbolic power of patronage, the representational value of imagery, and the persuasive force of historical narratives and canonical processes." Her contribution highlights the OIAA's impact on various spheres, including transnational webs of patronage, but she also and vividly recounts the sheer difficulties involved in the effort to exploit the fine arts for the sake of politics. Mexico's art world was not easily impressed and it resisted following aesthetic guidance from the United States. And Mexican policy makers, when steering the country toward close cooperation with the United States, were guided by a set of considerations that were certainly susceptible to U.S. influence, but that were hardly the product of the MoMA's undertakings on the fine arts front. Thus, while not ruling out the power of the arts *per se*, Paquette suggests that such representational enterprises are "dialogic" in nature, hence the difficulty of steering them toward specific policy objectives.

Recent case studies on Brazil point in a similar direction. Antonio Pedro Tota revisited the forces of cultural expansion as driven by the OIAA and, more importantly, by North America's popular culture industries. And while he suggests that Brazil was undergoing a process of Americanization as it moved closer to the United States in military, political and cultural matters, he found that this was a process that involved "resistance, anthropophagy, conditioning, and syncretism"[73] and thus more than a simple imposition by the United States. In this volume, Ursula Prutsch (chapter 7) shows how the OIAA's health, sanitary and economic assistance programs were appropriated by the Brazilian government in an ongoing state-building enterprise that was bent on integrating the country's wide and diverse territory. While highlighting bilateral cooperation and congruence of purpose in some realms, Prutsch

also shows how Brazilian policies to some extent undercut the OIAA's intents. More specifically, the promotion of a sense of nationhood, the *brasilidade,* hinged on a discourse that contrasted "racial democracy" at home to racist segregation and discrimination in the United States. And she suggests that those Brazilian intellectuals brought into closer contact with the American way of life, by way of fellowships and other means, tended to reinforce such state-sponsored constructions of difference and superiority of the Brazilian way.

Even in Colombia, where the guiding principle of foreign policies, the *respice polum,* dictates near-automatic alliance with the United States in all important matters,[74] local agency, rather than U.S. imposition, is now found to be the key explanatory factor. In his doctoral thesis, David Andrew Corcoran depicts a marked shift away from previously-dominant European educational and cultural models to U.S. modes and ideas during the times of the Liberal Republic (1930-46). Yet, rather than viewing this shift as a product of unilateral imposition, he stresses the keenness with which liberal modernizers, professionals and students responded to the educational and cultural programs offered by the United States. What is more, he argues that the success of such programs depended not least on their ability to adapt to local needs. For instance, Corcoran found the *Centro Colombo-Americano*, one of a series of cultural institutes established during the war and funded by the OIAA, to be shaped more by Colombian expectations than by U.S. foreign-policy directives in its daily educational practices.[75]

Moreover, and even in those programs where the OIAA relied less on local mediation and maintained a large measure of control over the contents it employed, there was little it could do to control the reception process. Much of the recent scholarship in communications studies stresses the importance of audiences in the communications equation. As James Lull argues, rather than being passive recipients, "[p]eople creatively modify ('appropriate') the messages they are given from media and elsewhere to fit their own ways of thinking and living."[76] Of course, scholars continue to disagree over the extent of autonomy people may exercise vis-à-vis the media. Yet there is no need to subscribe to an extreme version of the active-audience approach to communications studies[77] or to an overly-optimistic view as to the ability of subaltern hearts and minds to resist and subvert indoctrination in order to question the OIAA's effectiveness when it came to converting audiences, let alone recalcitrant ones. As Ortiz Garza suggests in chapter 5, it may very well be that the OIAA commanded substantial power in the agency-setting

process in Mexico's news and mass communications in general. And it is also reasonable to assume that massive wartime propaganda – as driven by the Mexican government and an uneasy coalition of Allied propaganda agencies – helped to prepare the wider public for a political shift toward close cooperation and alignment with the United States.[78] This was an outcome, however, that hardly testifies to the persuasive capacities of the OIAA in particular. As Ortiz Garza remarks, popular resentment toward the Colossus of the North remained rife.

Future case studies will no doubt continue to add to our knowledge by exploring the intricacies of interactions that took place in the different sets of "contact zones,"[79] a term that continues to displace previously-dominant notions of *dependency* in the literature on inter-American relations. Due to the complexity of the enterprise itself and the empirical difficulties involved, however, we may never be able to clearly ascertain the OIAA's net impact on public opinion, abroad or at home. Few would doubt that the Rockefeller office was far less successful than, say, the Jesuits when it came to winning hearts and minds in Latin America, as Alan Knight recently quipped.[80] But is it simply that it was not around long enough to leave a more pronounced mark? Many of the programs it unfolded – the sponsoring of people-to-people contacts, scholarships and student exchanges, cultural institutes and art exhibits – were clearly not designed to show immediate results and could only be expected to show slow, incremental change in the long run. If maintained over the long run, such programs would have complemented and reinforced broader market forces that drove cultural expansion by drawing on the attractions of U.S. popular culture industries, including movies, music, fashion or sports. Yet, while such long-term processes shaped Latin America's cultural fabric and consumption patterns, their significance in practical policy terms remains less than clear. If these processes constitute, as Nye suggests, the resources for soft power, it seems that such resources are not easily converted into policy tools, that is, into the construction of broad-based support for the United States in general and for U.S. policies on sensitive issues in particular. Or, to address the matter from a different theoretical angle, true hegemony in the Gramscian sense is difficult to come by, at least in the international arena and less so in the short run. Thus, if the United States was rather successful in mustering Latin American cooperation and support during the Second World War, it seems that this was due to a range of factors that may very well have included a sense of sympathy and solidarity with the Allied struggle against

fascism, but that was hardly the product of the OIAA's endeavors to instill good-neighborly sentiments.

These considerations suggest a caveat against overestimating the power of the United States to mold hearts and minds with a view to specific policy goals, but they should not be read to imply that such attempts at shaping public opinion are therefore inconsequential. The OIAA's programs provided incentives and opportunities and thus made a difference to individual lives and careers and to the civil organizations, government institutions and business enterprises that inhabited the expanding "contact zones" cultivated by the OIAA's public diplomacy programs. And the harder-edged policies to control public opinion could not but have repercussions. As chapter 6 in this volume suggests, massive interventions in the communications systems of the Rio de la Plata did not produce the desired result, that is, they did not change Argentina's foreign policies and prevent Juan Domingo Perón's rise to power, but they did help to make the media a political battlefield. Or, as chapter 5 by Ortiz Garza suggests, heavy-handed intrusions into Mexico's communications systems by a variety of actors, including the OIAA, were certainly not conducive to the development of a strong and independent press. Such effects may be viewed as collateral damage in a wider struggle for a just cause, but damage it was.

The contributions to this volume

The essays presented here are the product of various years of cooperation and discussion. Our authors initially met at a workshop on Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs held at the Rockefeller Archive Center (Tarrytown, New York) in August 2005. Made possible by a generous grant from the Rockefeller Archive Center, this workshop provided a hospitable environment for a first round of explorations and it inspired most of us to rethink, revise and return to the archives for further research. Over the following years, we continued to meet at various international conferences and to discuss our findings. The chapters that follow address different facets of the OIAA's wider range of operations, but they do so from distinct disciplinary angles, including history and art history, film and communications studies.

Chapter 1 by historian Uwe Lübken builds on his earlier publications on the Nazi threat to Latin America and, more specifically, on the rise and the

nature of threat perceptions among U.S. policy makers and the public at large. In this volume, he explores the dilemmas policy makers faced when seeking to confront the Nazi threat in Latin America. On the one hand, they felt constrained by the underlying principles of the Good Neighbor policy which precluded interventions in the domestic and foreign affairs of the Latin American republics. On the other hand, they perceived an imminent danger to the national security of the United States and the need for a forceful response. The turn to cultural diplomacy and the establishment of the OIAA, Lübken argues, were meant to resolve such dilemmas. The OIAA would provide a forceful response to the Nazi threat, but would rely on private actors and initiative, rather than on a government propaganda apparatus. Yet, while internal policy debates evince qualms and hesitations, the road taken soon led to an overtly propagandistic approach.

The following two essays analyze the OIAA's motion picture programs. Chapter 2 by media analyst and producer Pennee Bender focuses on the educational film program and specifically on those ventures that aimed at educating U.S. citizens about Latin America. The educational film program operated under strict governmental oversight and therefore provides a privileged avenue to analyzing the OIAA's objectives and discursive strategies. These 16mm films encompass different formats, including travelogues and personal portraits. They depict Latin America as modern, socially progressive and in many ways similar to the United States and they portray its citizens as capable and trustworthy. However, while they hail Latin America's developmental potential as very promising, they also intimate that the sister republics required U.S. assistance in order to fulfill their promise. Such messages went well beyond short-term policy goals, Bender argues. The OIAA aimed at persuading U.S. citizens that their government and entrepreneurs needed to assume an active and long-term role in Latin America in order to assure the future well-being of the hemisphere.

By contrast, chapter 3 by film historian Catherine Benamou turns to the OIAA's theatrical film program. She highlights the extent to which the OIAA's objectives and policies overlapped with those of the major film studios in Hollywood, but she also draws attention to some sources of frictions. Building on her previous extensive research on *It's All True,* a film project supported by the OIAA and directed by Orson Welles, Benamou provides a fine-grained analysis of two of the agency's most prominent "goodwill ambassadors," Orson Welles and Walt Disney. Both cooperated extensively with the OIAA and both were expected to translate the discourse of Pan-Americanism

into a filmic narrative that would attract and please wider audiences throughout the Americas. Yet, as Benamou explains, the two directors approached their task in their own, distinct ways and they dealt very differently with the sets of challenges they had to confront in the process. Disney played it safe by keeping in line not only with the OIAA's general policies, but also, and more importantly, with established studio protocols regulating production procedures and contents. He was thereby able to accommodate the demands of both government and corporate interests. By contrast, Welles's somewhat subversive approach to Pan-Americanism violated established studio protocols and therefore soon lost the support of RKO.

Chapter 4 by art historian Catha Paquette focuses on the OIAA's fine arts programs and, more specifically, on those spearheaded by MoMA and aiming at public opinion in Mexico. She contends that such programs may indeed have an impact on ideological frameworks that inform the behavior and decision-making processes on the individual and aggregate levels. Yet, she also suggests that such programs are difficult to exploit in practical policy terms. Their success relies on the responsiveness of those they are targeting. The reactions they encounter are therefore difficult to predict, let alone to control.

Chapter 5 continues to explore the OIAA's efforts to influence public opinion in Mexico, but it does so from a different angle, that of the press. Communications scholar José Luis Ortiz Garza analyzes the war years as one of the "darkest chapters" in the history of the Mexican press. Based on archival research in the United States, Mexico and Britain, he shows how foreign propaganda agencies all too easily bought and cajoled their way into Mexico's newspapers and magazines. The OIAA was but one of a number of actors seeking to shape the contents of the press. In comparison to German and British-French propaganda agencies, however, it was able to draw on more bountiful resources and it continued its mission long after Nazi Germany's subversive activities had been brought to a halt.

Together with films and the press, radio was another important means to reach mass audiences. Chapter 6 by historian Gisela Cramer provides an overview of the OIAA's use of radio broadcasts to influence public opinion in Latin America before zooming in on a rather peculiar case: Argentina. Whereas other countries in the region moved toward close cooperation with the United States, Argentina's wartime governments turned toward a policy of open defiance. Cramer shows how the OIAA struggled to build and maintain a presence on the Argentine airwaves. Facing increasingly strict censor-

ship, it moved much of its broadcasting activities into neighboring Uruguay from where it sought to undermine the authoritarian grip of Argentina's military government. In the end, however, the battle for hearts and minds was lost to the rising force of Peronism. While it is impossible to gauge the impact of the OIAA's programming activities in particular, Cramer suggests, it seems that the net effect of forceful interventions to influence the political affairs and course of events in Argentina ran counter to the objectives of U.S. foreign policies in that they helped to produce a nationalist backlash that supported the Peronist cause and claim to legitimacy.

Chapter 7 by historian Ursula Prutsch takes a broader view of the OIAA's operations in Brazil. Here, the agency engaged in a wide range of programs that assisted in preparing the grounds for the country's increasingly close cooperation with the United States in political, economic and military terms. Prutsch highlights the Brazilian part in the inter-American equation and, more precisely, the ways in which the Brazilian government under Getúlio Vargas skillfully assimilated and even manipulated the OIAA's programs for its own policy agendas. Although cooperative in a wide range of matters of bilateral interest, the Brazilian government by no means acquiesced in all of the OIAA's policies. Thus, it censored the OIAA's propaganda output and limited its means to address audiences.

Chapter 8 by historian Thomas Leonard provides the first account of the OIAA's operations in Central America. More precisely, he focuses on the organizational infrastructure, that is, on the workings of the Coordination Committees that, here as elsewhere in Latin America, provided the backbone for the implementation of the OIAA's policies on the ground. The Coordination Committees typically comprised representatives of major U.S. companies in the region. In the small and dependent republics of Central America, they commanded substantial political clout but, as Leonard shows, cooperation with local authorities was not always smooth and relations with headquarters in Washington were bumpy at times. In Central America, moreover, the OIAA met with considerable difficulties when trying to communicate with the people at large. Rather small segments of the population had access to the press, radio or films, and much of the region evinced very low literacy rates. Nevertheless, even in such restrictive environments, the OIAA's Coordination Committees found ways and means to connect.

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Notes

1. For a detailed analysis of the rise, pervasiveness and particularities of U.S. threat perceptions see Uwe Lübken, *Bedrohliche Nähe. Die USA und die nationalsozialistische Herausforderung in Lateinamerika, 1937-1945* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2004); see also David G. Haglund, *Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936-1940* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984).
2. Hubert Herring, *Good Neighbors. Argentina, Brazil, Chile & Seventeen Other Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 327.
3. "Latin America: Army of Amateurs," *Time*, Monday, Jun. 9, 1941.
4. Duncan Aikman, "The Machinery for Hemisphere Cooperation," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 6, No. 4 (Winter 1942): 551.
5. We have sketched out its major functions in "Nelson A. Rockefeller's Office of Inter-American Affairs and Record Group 229," *Hispanic-American Historical Review* 86, No. 4 (Nov. 2006): 785-806.
6. Recent in-depth studies tend to focus on specific countries or programs: Antonio Pedro Tota, *The Seduction of Brazil: the Americanization of Brazil during World War II* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009); Ursula Prutsch, *Creating Good Neighbors? Die Kultur- und Wirtschaftspolitik der USA in Lateinamerika, 1940-1946* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2008); David Andrew Corcoran, "The Infrastructure of Influence: Transnational Collaboration and the Spread of U.S. Cultural Influence in Colombia, 1930s-1960s" (PhD diss. University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 2011); Francisco Peredo Castro, *Cine y propaganda para Latinoamérica. México y Estados Unidos en la encrucijada de los años cuarenta* (México: UNAM, 2004); Pennee Bender, "Film as an Instrument of the Good Neighbor Policy, 1930s-1950s" (PhD diss. New York University, 2002); Jennifer L. Campbell, "Shaping solidarity: Music, Diplomacy, and Inter-American Relations, 1936-1946," (PhD diss. University of Connecticut, 2010).
7. Much of the recent upsurge in the study of public diplomacy deals with the Cold War. See, for instance, Nicholas John Cull, *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
8. To name but a few pathbreaking studies that have touched upon the OIAA: Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas. U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Emily Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1982).
9. The landmark publication continues to be: Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine LeGrand and Ricardo D. Salvatore (eds.), *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of U.S.-Latin American Relations* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998). On the general trend see Max Paul Friedman, "Retiring the Puppets, Bringing Latin America Back In: Recent Scholarship on United States-Latin American Relations," *Diplomatic History* 27:5 (Nov. 2003): 621-636; focusing squarely on the OIAA: Prutsch, *Creating Good Neighbors?;* Tota, *The Seduction of Brazil*; Corcoran, "The Infrastructure of Influence."

10. See, for instance, Julio Moreno, *Yankee Don't Go Home: Mexican Nationalism, American Business Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico, 1920-1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
11. See, for instance, the daily content guidelines for radio news editors suggesting how to interpret news materials received by AP, UP and other agencies: National Archives II (hereafter NA), Record Group (RG) 229, Entry 1, General Records, Central Files, Box 240, 3. Information. Radio. Operating Plans and Procedures, File. Daily Guidance Notes.
12. Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion,* 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2006), 7.
13. Congress explicitly barred the USIA from distributing or publicizing its information programs in the United States for fear that the agency could be used to "propagandize" U.S. citizens; see Hans Tuch, *Communicating with the World. U.S. Public Diplomacy Overseas* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 29. However, the USIA did interact with broad segments of U.S. society by sponsoring people-to-people programs and other initiatives requiring the participation of civil society; for a recent comprehensive account of the USIA and adjacent agencies see Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War. Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2006).
14. Various authors have noted a marked anti-European twist in the OIAA's discursive strategies; see, for instance, Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, 35; Peredo Castro, *Cine y propaganda*, 231-232, 465.
15. Tuch, *Communicating with the World*; see also Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 619 (March 2008): 103.
16. Definitions of *cultural diplomacy* vary greatly. We follow a widely-made distinction between *cultural diplomacy* and *cultural relations.* Whereas the latter consists of people-to-people activities, the former is supported (though not necessarily controlled) by a government and is part of a wider policy. In real life, the boundaries between these activities may be fluid, but this does not invalidate the need for a conceptual distinction.
17. The "wartime departure" from the traditional view is best explained in Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, 35-60.
18. Few of the OIAA's interactions with what were called "key groups" have been explored as yet.
19. Thus, some of the most mind-numbing radio propaganda was produced and sponsored not by the OIAA but by Sterling Products. The company sponsored jingles (for instance, "Américas unidas – unidas vencerán") that, in some parts of Latin America, were repeated with such frequency that listeners started to make jokes about them. For instance, Sterling Products was said to deliberately create headaches in order to increase its sales of headache tablets ("Mejoral"); see José Luis Ortiz Garza, "La unidad de las Américas en la propaganda radiofónica de Estados Unidos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial" (2008), unpublished manuscript, 20.

20. For a rather celebratory view on the wartime changes in Hollywood's representational practices see Allen L. Woll, *The Latin Image in American Film* (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Studies, 1980), 53-75; for a more critical perspective see Shari Roberts, "'The Lady in the Tutti-Frutti Hat': Carmen Miranda, a spectacle of Ethnicity," *Cinema Journal* 32:3 (Spring 1993), 3-23. As Roberts suggests, Hollywood's good-neighbor musicals tended to "reinforce regressive stereotypes of Latin Americans and of women, and to support racist and sexist conceptions." Yet, she also suggests that Carmen Miranda's exaggerated performance at the same time can be read as a parody of these stereotypes and thus allows for a "subversive reading" (p. 19).
21. Gisela Cramer "How to Do Things with Waves: United States Radio and Latin America in the Times of the Good Neighbor," in: Alejandra Bronfman and Andrew G. Wood (eds.), *Media, Sound and Culture in Latin America and the Caribbean* (Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 2012).
22. Nye, *Soft Power*, X.
23. Joseph S. Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 619 (March 2008): 94-109.
24. Alan Knight, "U.S. Imperialism/Hegemony and Latin American Resistance," in: *Empire and Dissent. The United States and Latin America*, ed. Fred Rosen (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 29.
25. This includes Nye, "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," 97-98.
26. On new tax regulations and their effects in Mexico see Moreno, *Yankee Don't Go Home*, 10, 72.
27. James D. Henderson, *Modernization of Colombia: The Laureano Gómez Years*, *1889-1965* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001), 273-274.
28. On the blacklisting of Argentine cinemas see Prutsch, *Creating Good Neighbors,* 387-388. At the same time, Argentina's film industry experienced a downturn due to a U.S. embargo that curtailed the exports of critical materials to Argentina, including raw film; see Tamara L. Falicov, "Hollywood's Rogue Neighbor: the Argentine Film Industry during the Good Neighbor Policy," *The Americas* 63:2 (Oct. 2006): 245-260.
29. In Colombia, for example, the OIAA found that about 90 percent of the articles it offered for reprint were published somewhere in the country, but it was less successful with the larger and well-established papers in the capital; see Corcoran, "The Infrastructure of Influence," 318, 323.
30. For a detailed analysis see, for instance, Peredo Castro, *Cine y propaganda*.
31. The involvement of Santos and Carpentier has not been fully explored as yet. Further information is to be found in the country files of the OIAA's Coordination Committees in Colombia and Cuba at NA, RG 229.
32. For instance, they usually refrained from discussing Latin American politics in any depth.
33. We are following a conceptualization specified by Ricardo D. Salvatore, "The Enterprise of Knowledge: Representational Machines of Informal Empire," in: Joseph et al., *Close Encounters*, 69-104.

34. See, for instance, Nelson A. Rockefeller to C.D. Jackson, *Time,* Inc., Oct. 20, 1942 (Rockefeller Archive Center, RG 4, Nelson A. Rockefeller Washington D.C. File, CIAA Correspondence Files, 1941-1942 Reel 5 J-Z Sept-Dec 1942 A-R, March-April 1943).
35. For some of the export restrictions see, for instance, Lübken, *Bedrohliche Nähe*, 363-364.
36. This does not imply that the exercise of hegemony necessarily amounts to a zero-sum game. For neo-Gramscian views on soft power see Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (eds.), *Soft Power and U.S. Foreign Policy. Theoretical, Historical, and Contemporary Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2010).
37. For a recent neo-Gramscian contribution that allows for some autonomy of the cultural realm see Giles Scott-Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and Post-War American Hegemony* (London: Routledge, 2002).
38. The OIAA's positioning on African-American issues has not been fully explored as yet. For a preliminary discussion see Corcoran, "The Infrastructure of Influence," 293-294.
39. Kenneth R. Janken, *Rayford Logan and the Dilemma of the African-American Intellectual* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), 114-144.
40. The OWI, by contrast, assumed a somewhat more assertive position and thereby provoked a major stir. See, for instance, the uproar produced by OWI's pamphlet *Negroes and the War* in: Barbara Dianne Savage, *Broadcasting Freedom: Radio, War, and the Politics of Race, 1938-1948* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 108, 124-135. In this context, it is also interesting to note that the OIAA (and in contrast to the USIA later on) was rather hesitant when it came to the employment of jazz in its cultural diplomacy programs; for a preliminary discussion see Campbell, "Shaping solidarity," 74-87.
41. On the OIAA's reactions to the Zoot-Suit riots see Amy Lynn Spellacy, "Neighbors North and South: Literary Culture, Political Rhetoric and Inter-American Relations in the Era of the Good Neighbor Policy 1928-1948" (PhD diss. University of Iowa, 2006), 10, 308-323.
42. Marxist scholars are not the only ones to point to Rockefeller's concerns about the rising tides of nationalism: see, for instance, Darlene Rivas, *Missionary Capitalist. Nelson Rockefeller in Venezuela* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 232-233 n72.
43. The fashion and cosmetics industry's wartime strategies have not been explored as yet. For primary evidence see, for instance, the wartime editions of *Vogue* and other U.S. fashion magazines.
44. Minutes of Meeting of Policy Committee of the Coordinator's Office, New York, Oct. 14, 1940, p. 6. (NA, RG 229, Entry 10, Records of the Immediate Office of the Coordinator. Minutes of Meetings, Box 543, Black Folder without Name).
45. For instance, the OIAA overrode protests by major Hollywood studios against the sponsoring and equipment of the Mexican film industry, a major competitor in Latin America; see Peredo Castro, *Cine y propaganda,* 151-158.

46. See chapter 6 in this volume and Robert A. Rabe, "Selling the Shortwaves: Commercial Broadcasting to Latin America and the Limits of the 'American System,'" *American Journalism* 24:4 (Winter 2007): 127-148.
47. The OIAA's cooperation with the Catholic Church has not yet been fully explored, although the OIAA's archives (NA, RG 229) contain a wealth of evidence on the subject. On Catholic pressures to curtail Protestant missionary activities in Latin America see, for instance, "Reformed Synod Defends Missions," *New York Times*, Jun. 6, 1943; "Religion Not Involved, Hull Says," *New York Times,* May 27, 1944.
48. See Jeremy Tunstall, *The Media Are American* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977) and the author's revised position in *The Media Were American* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
49. For a brief overview of the rise of the media imperialism paradigm, its major exponents and critics see Colleen Roach, "Cultural Imperialism and Resistance in Media Theory and Literary Theory," *Media, Culture and Society* 19:1 (Jan. 1997): 47-66.
50. Fred Fejes, *Imperialism, Media, and the Good Neighbor* (Norwood, NJ: Ablex, 1984).
51. Fred Fejes, "Media Imperialism: an Assessment," *Media, Culture and Society*, 3:3 (1981), 287.
52. See José Luis Ortiz Garza, *Ideas en tormenta. La opinión pública en México en la segunda guerra mundial* (Naucalpán: Ediciones Ruz, 2007), chapter 7.
53. Hadley Cantril, *Public Opinion, 1935-1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), 502.
54. This was partly the result of Rockefeller's ability to bridge Washington's partisan divide and his talent for ingratiating himself with possible critics. Rockefeller's leadership style is best explained in Cary Reich, *The Life of Nelson A. Rockefeller. Worlds to Conquer, 1908-1958* (New York: Doubleday, 1996).
55. The OWI was subject to intense controversies; see Allan M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda. The Office of War Information, 1942-1945* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978), 66-72.
56. Laurence Duggan, *The Americas. The Search for Hemisphere Security* (New York: Holt and Company, 1949), 161, 162.
57. Quoted in "Argentina: Neighborly Lesson," in: *Time,* Aug. 11, 1941.
58. Toward the later war years, as it became increasingly clear that Latin America would not become a theater of war, U.S. policy makers became less inclined to support dictators. On the policy shift see Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough (eds.), *Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War,* 1944-1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
59. On the incident itself, see Ellis O. Briggs, *Proud Servant. The Memoirs of a Career Ambassador* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1998), 132-136, 197-202. On the wider U.S. policies toward Trujillo see Eric Paul Roorda, *The Dictator Next Door: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Trujillo Regime in the Dominican Republic, 1930-1945* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1998).

60. Thus, Peruvian political activists and intellectuals Raúl Haya de la Torre and Manuel Seoane remained deeply critical of the OIAA, although they supported a wartime alliance with the United States. The response of Latin America's democratic forces has not yet been fully investigated. For a preliminary discussion on the aforementioned Peruvian critics, see Spellacy, "Neighbors North and South," chapter IV.
61. This was supposedly the mandate of the USIA. Yet this agency, too, developed propaganda strategies that went far beyond "selling the American way of life". See, for instance, Osgood, *Total Cold War*, 110.
62. On the origins of the term see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
63. For instance, to have Bernardo O'Higgins declare himself to be a "Peruvian," as happened in one the dramatized radio series paying homage to Latin America's liberators, may not have produced consternation among U.S. audiences, but in Chile it caused somewhat of an uproar, see Memorandum Ogilvie to Roberts, Nov. 13, 1943 (NA, RG 229, Entry 1, General Records, Central Files, Box 240, 3. Information. Radio. Operating Plans and Procedures, File: Policy).
64. A Brazilian advisor to the OIAA delivered one of the most damning critiques of radio contents with a Pan-American spin; see Hernane Tavares de Sá, *The Brazilians. People of Tomorrow* (New York: John Day, 1947), 229-236.
65. David Welky, *The Moguls and the Dictators. Hollywood and the Coming of World War II* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 111.
66. On Hollywood's reception in Latin America see Gaizka S. de Usabel, *The High Noon of American Films in Latin America* (Ann Arbor: UMI Research, 1982); on the critical reception of the good-neighbor musicals see also Thomas Schatz, *Boom and Bust. American Cinema in the 1940s* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), 25-27.
67. Quoted in "Argentina: Neighborly Lesson," in: *Time,* Aug. 11, 1941. (The italics are ours).
68. Peredo Castro, *Cine y propaganda,* 215.
69. Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New York: Harcourt, 1942), 235, 256.
70. David L. Rousseau, *Identifying Threats and Threatening Identities. The Social Construction of Realism and Liberalism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006).
71. Seth Fein, "Transnationalization and Cultural Collaboration: Mexican Film Propaganda during World War II," *Studies in Latin American Popular Culture* 17 (1998): 105-128.
72. For the lyrics see Peredo Castro, *Cine y propaganda,* 215.
73. Tota, *The Seduction of Brazil,* 120.
74. This doctrine dictates that foreign policies should be guided by the "polar star," the United States. On the origins and contents of the *respice polum* see Gerhard Drekonja, *Retos de la política exterior colombiana* (Bogotá: Centro de Estudios Internacionales, 1983).
75. Corcoran, "The Infrastructure of Influence."

76. James Lull, *Media, Communication, Culture. A Global Approach* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 64.
77. For a brief but perceptive critique see David Morley, "Active Audience Theory: Pendulums and Pitfalls," *Journal of Communication* 43, 3 (Autumn 1993): 13-19; for further discussion see his "Unanswered Questions in Audience Research," *The Communications Review* 9 (2006): 101-121.
78. On the wartime propaganda of the Mexican government see also Monica A. Rankin, *¡Mexico, la patria!: Propaganda and Production During World War II* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2009).
79. Marie Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes. Travel Writing and Transculturation* (New York: Routledge, 1992); Joseph et al., *Close Encounters*; Corcoran, "The Infrastructure of Influence."
80. Knight, "U.S. Imperialism," 29.